True Left

OLD CONTENT contd.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-france-lab/france-says-no-evidence-covid-19-linked-to-wuhan-research-lab-idUSKBN21Z2ME

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Cuomo seems to see that the "outcompete the Reds in blaming China" approach is wrong:



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A positive article dating from before the current crisis, which shows how much relations have worsened in just the last few months:

www.huffpost.com/entry/us-china-relations-kevin-rudd-report_b_7096784

a core geopolitical fact emerging from the report is that we are now seeing the rise of what Evan Feigenbaum has described as “two Asias”: an “economic Asia” that is increasingly dominated by China; and a “security Asia” that remains dominated by the United States. China is now a bigger trading partner with every country in Asia than the United States. The U.S. is either an ally or strategic partner of the bulk of maritime Asia. By contrast, China’s only strategic “ally” is North Korea, which has become a greater strategic liability than an asset. If strategic tensions drove the U.S. and China into adversarial postures, regional states would face increasingly irresistible pressure to make a zero sum strategic choice between the two.
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The report argues that the time is ripe to consider alternative institutional approaches that integrate both China and the U.S. into a common regional arrangement, and with a mandate to tackle both security and economic challenges. If competing structures are established, these will exacerbate regional division. Furthermore, the report argues that any explicit attempt to exclude the U.S. from the regional security architecture is more likely to strengthen existing U.S. military alliances, rather than weaken them. Rather than playing an institutional tug-of-war, it would be far more constructive for the U.S. and China to join hands in building pan-regional institutional arrangements. This will not solve all regional security challenges. But it will help to manage, and reduce, them over time. Confidence-building measures could cascade into a more transparent security culture and, in time, a more secure Asia. But this can only happen if both powers decide to invest common capital into a common regional institution. Otherwise, we really do find ourselves in the world of the “zero sum game.”
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Before “détente,” in the latter period of the Cold War, a joint narrative between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was not possible. Both sides were not only ideological enemies. They were declared military enemies. They fought proxy wars. And they were in a permanent state of readiness to go to war directly, and in extremis, to destroy one another in a nuclear exchange. Over time, however, the U.S. and the Soviet Union did develop basic protocols to avoid crises and unintended confrontation.

By contrast, despite the difficulties, the U.S.-China relationship remains in decidedly positive territory. Since 1972, U.S.-China relations have remained more functional than those between the U.S. and the Soviet Union ever were, and have never escalated to a comparable level of hostility. As noted above, both China and the United States have private and semi-public strategic narratives about each other. But as yet they do not have a shared strategic narrative between each other. Such a common strategic narrative for U.S.-China relations may be difficult, but it is certainly not impossible. And given the stakes involved for the future, it is increasingly necessary.

A common strategic framework for U.S.-China relations would offer many advantages.

First, in Washington, it would help provide strategic direction to government agencies competing for policy attention and space, as well as those multiple agencies engaged in aspects of the China relationship but not on a daily basis, thereby helping to provide policy coherence in engaging on an inter- agency basis, as well as with Chinese interlocutors;
Second, in Beijing it would go beyond that because of the more hierarchical nature of the political and bureaucratic decision-making process, providing direction to the system at large; and
Third, for both powers, a coherent strategic framework would also inject additional positive ingredients: a common determination to manage significant differences effectively in order to avoid unnecessary confrontation; a common commitment to collaborate in difficult policy areas with a view to resolving them; and a common sense of purpose to build political capital and strategic trust over time.

For these reasons, the report argues that the ideational content of a common strategic framework for the relationship should be: “realist” about those areas of the relationship which are not possible to resolve within the foreseeable future; “constructive” about those areas that could be resolved with high-level political effort at the bilateral, regional and global levels; and guided by a “common purpose” to build strategic trust, step by step, over time, not based on declaratory statements, but instead on common action in resolving common problems.

It goes without saying that the strategic narrative should be based around anti-Duginism.

By the way, do you guys remember how back in the Counterculture era US-China cooperation was a theme in pop culture?



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if a US-China alliance is able to form, Japan, Australia, etc. will no longer be placed in a position such that friendliness towards China is perceived as hostility towards the US (as above). Literally everyone benefits except Duginists.

At the moment in the US, only academics seem willing to say what Blue politicians should be saying:

www.globaltimes.cn/content/1187744.shtml

I think the big question has to do with the role of good government. Who can provide the kind of government and leadership that is needed in a crisis situation like this? So far, countries in eastern Asia have done much better than what Europe and the US have done. I'm not sure if that has to do with the system of government. I wonder if it has more to do with political culture than actual political systems.

Not many Americans have lived in China for a long period of time and been able to see China from the inside. And likewise, not many Chinese people are able to see the US from the inside. Therefore, I think they often imagine on both sides that the other country is much more different from themselves. That is actually the case. Many Americans see China as a more successful variation of the Soviet Union. But in reality, since I've lived in both countries, I can say that China today is miles away from what was the Soviet Union.
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My view has always been that the most important thing is for the two countries to find things that they can cooperate on. It's simply not true that the US and China have opposite interests on every issue. With regard to the control of global epidemics and climate change, both countries do have similar interests.

I suspect that another reason why the US is much more hostile towards China than vice versa is because of relative lack of American familiarity with Chinese pop culture compared to the other way round. Whereas there are countless Chinese fans of Marvel/DC superheroes, for example, there are far fewer American fans of wuxia. I believe one of the best vehicles towards improving US-China relations would be to promote Chinese pop culture in the US.

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It is annoying how incompetent China is at PR:

www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/chinas-anxieties-reveal-schism-89568

On April 24, China’s biggest government think tank, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) published in its China Social Science Journal a lengthy 3,152-character report analysing US media attacks against China during the Covid-19 pandemic. Published only in Chinese, it identified six main characteristics of the US media ‘slandering and denigrating China’ and said Beijing needs to prepare for future propaganda wars against China during major emergencies.

The CASS report recommended six steps for winning ‘public opinion battles’. Among them are: coordinating with government media, private media, diplomats, enterprises and think tanks to coordinate quick and effective counter-attacks; use all channels including social media and mobilise companies, think tanks, foreign scholars and experts who are ‘China-friendly’ to speak and write articles on foreign platforms; and hire and train people to write op-ed articles in foreign languages and ‘borrow’ think-tank experts and foreign journalists to edit Chinese state media abroad.

These "steps" all pertain to mere logistics, which should be the job of administrators, not of think-tanks. What a think-tank is supposed to offer is advice about narrative. If there is no consistent underlying narrative, two quick counterattacks can easily clash and make both seem disingenuous. If there is no consistent underlying narrative, the more channels you use the more confused your message becomes. If there is no consistent underlying narrative, multilingual presentation will worsen all existing confusion.

What is China's narrative?

(Hint: if China wants good relations with the US, China must convince the US that the two countries have a common enemy.)